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ABSTRACT 
One of the major contributors to the survivability of a surface combatant is her reduced 
vulnerability to weapon effects and as such the VKLS¶V damage stability characteristics 
determine a VKLS¶V DELOLW\ WR UHVLVW WKH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI SRVVLEOH IORRGLQJ QDPHO\ WR QRW
capsize and/or sink. There are serious concerns about the limitations of the current semi-
HPSLULFDO GHWHUPLQLVWLF FULWHULD LQ ZKLFK D FRPEDWDQW¶V GDPDJH VWDELOLW\ LV DVVHVVHG XSRQ
This paper details a comparison between the current approach and a newly presented 
probabilistic approach with the aim of determining which will result in a more accurate way 
of estimating the level of survivability of a particular design. A study is also presented in 
which the maximum damage length used in the naval ship assessment is increased to 
merchant ship standards of 0.24Lbp.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Surface warships differ from other categories of ships in that they are designed to operate in a 
man-made hostile environment. In addition to being able to withstand damage from collision 
and grounding, a surface combatant must be able to avoid and withstand the effects of 
modern anti-ship weapons. As warships are designed and built to support high-end combat 
operations, suUYLYDELOLW\DQGWKHDELOLW\WRµILJKWKXUW¶LVDYLWDOGHVLJQREMHFWLYH 
One of the main contributors to a surface combatant¶s survivability is her invulnerability to 
weapon effects and as such the damage stability and floatation characteristics of the vessel 
determine its vulnerability. Therefore, it is critical for the designer to minimise the 
vulnerability of the vessel from the early design stages in order to maximise its survivability. 
This can be achieved through the use of optimal subdivision, adequate reserved buoyancy and 
by considering a large number of damage scenarios and combinations of operational and 
environmental conditions. 
For the past half of century the majority of warship stability criteria was based on a set of 
empirically defined stability criteria proposed by Sarchin and Goldberg (1960) based largely 
on WWII battle damage experience. The criteria used by major navies such as the U.S Navy 
(USN) and Royal Navy (RN) have been reviewed over the years however, there have been no 
significant changes yet. Although the criteria have served their purpose for many years, they 
now appear to be outdated, given the advances in our capability to simulate the behaviour of 
a ship after damage (Harmsen, 2000; Mc Taggart, 2000), and there are serious concerns about 
their limitations and applicability to modern naval ship designs. Some of the shortfalls of the 
criteria incluide  (Surko, 1994);   
x Capability of modern warships to survive damage from current threats, in demanding 
environmental conditions, is not known 
x Modern hull forms and construction techniques differ greatly from the ships used to 
determine the criteria 
x Assumption of moderate wind and sea conditions at the time of damage 
This suggests that even though a vessel may comply with the standards outlined, the designer 
and operator may not have a clear understanding of the survivability performance and 
operational limits of their vessel.  
In view of these shortcomings a number of naval organisations established the Co-operative 
Research Navies (CRNav) Dynamic Stability group back in 1989 with the aim to provide 
better understanding to the physical phenomena and characteristics of dynamic stability 
(Perrault, 2010). This led to the formation in 1999 of the Naval Stability Standards Working 
*URXS166:*WDVNHGWRGHYHORS³a shared view on the future of naval stability assessment 
and develop a Naval Stability Standards Guidelines document which can be utilized by the 
participating navies at their discretion´(Perrault, 2010). 
In contrast to the slow progress of naval standards, the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) have made significant advances in terms of upgrading safety standards of merchant 
vessels. The acceptance of the new harmonized probabilistic damage stability framework of 
SOLAS 2009 for the damage stability assessment of passenger and dry cargo vessels shows 
that the maritime industry and regulatory bodies are convinced that this is the right way 
forward. Boulougouris and Papanikolaou (2004) previously presented a methodology for the 
probabilistic damaged stability assessment of naval combatants and its application to their 
design optimisation. The methodology allows the risk that the vessel will be lost, as a result 
of damage, to be quantified. Thus, minimal risk can become a design optimisation objective 
and the surface naval ship can be optimised for minimum risk while still being efficient and 
economical.  
This paper details a comparative study of the currently used semi-empirical deterministic 
approach and the proposed quasi-static probabilistic approach to assessing the damage 
stability of a surface combatant. Each approach is applied to a generic frigate and the merits 
and shortcomings of each method along with the results are presented. In addition, a study 
was carried out on a frigate which meets the current deterministic criteria in order to observe 
the effects of increasing the survivable damage length.  
2. SURVIVABILITY 
The survivability of a naval combatant can be defined as ³WKHFDSDELOLW\RIDQDYDOVKLSDQG
its shipboard systems to avoid and withstand a weapons effects environment without 
VXVWDLQLQJ LPSDLUPHQW RI WKHLU DELOLW\ WR DFFRPSOLVK GHVLJQDWHG PLVVLRQV´ (Said, 1995). 
Survivability consists of two main aspects;  
x Susceptibility ± Inability of the ship to avoid being damaged in operation and is also 
referred to as the probability of being hit (PH) 
x Vulnerability ± Inability of the ship to withstand the effects of a threat weapon and is 
also referred to as the probability of serious damage or loss when hit (PK/H) 
Survivability is the opposite of killability which is the probability that the ship will be lost 
due to enemy action. Killability can be described mathematically as the product of 
susceptibility and vulnerability. A ship kill can be expressed in many different ways, in this 
case the definition given by Ball & Calvano (1994) is referred to;  
 System Kill ± damage of one or more compartments which leads to the failure of a ship 
system. 
 Mission Area Kill ± damage which leads to the loss of a mission critical area such as 
Anti ±Air Warfare (AAW) 
 Mobility Kill ± damage which leads to the ship being immobilised through the loss of 
propulsion or steering. 
 Total Ship Kill ± damage which leads to the loss of the ship through insufficient 
buoyancy, loss of transverse stability or abandonment due to fire.  
The mathematical relationship between survivability (Ps), susceptibility and vulnerability is 
as follows (Ball and Calvano, 1994): 
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The relationship infers that both susceptibility and vulnerability are of equal importance to 
WKHVXUYLYDELOLW\RIWKHYHVVHO6RPHQDYDOGHVLJQSKLORVRSKLHVKDYHLQFOXGHGWRµGHVLJQIRU
SHDFH¶ DV WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI EHLQJ GDPDJHG LQ RSHUDWLRQ LV YHU\ ORZ 7KH\ ZLOO WKHUHIRUH
accept that in the event of a hit that the vessel will be out of action or have limited 
participation in the operation. Thus their focus has been to minimise the susceptibility of the 
vessel. Most of the scenario simulations ran would assume a single hit has a kill probability 
equal to one for smaller vessels and two hits would be assumed sufficient to sink a larger 
vessel. Although modern surface ships are powerful military assets on the open ocean, they 
lose their advantage near shore. Even the stealthiest vessel is susceptible to asymmetrical 
threats. Thus, by treating the vulnerability as a property with a deterministic outcome, pass or 
fail, it is not possible to truly quantify the survivability of the vessel. 
3. DETERMINISTIC ASSESSMENT 
Currently both the USN and RN use deterministic criteria to assess the stability of naval ships 
after damage. The stability standards previously used by the UK MOD, NES 109, was 
recently reissued in DEFSTAN 02-900 part 1: Ship safety & Environmental Protection (UK 
MOD, 2013). However, the criteria used in the assessment of stability and reserve buoyancy 
after damage remain unchanged. Table 1 shows the semi-empirical damage stability criteria 
currently used by the USN and RN for surface combatants. Both use a damage length of 15% 
Lwl for larger vessels however the UK also implements a minimum damage length of 21m. 
Although the survivability requirements between naval ships and merchant vessels differ 
significantly it is of interest to note that the current IMO probabilistic damage approach 
considers damage extents up to 24%. 
 Although both criteria are very similar the UK criteria are slightly more demanding, namely 
the use of a 15 degree roll back angle requires that UK warships have a greater righting 
energy to achieve the same reserve dynamic stability criteria. In addition, the use of a 
minimum length of damage shows progress towards a threat based standard for damage 
length. 
 
 
  
Table 1 ± Current UK and US damage stability criteria for surface combatants 
Criteria UK Defstan 02-900 U.S.N DDS 079-1 
 LWL < 30m 1 Compartment LWL < 100ft 1 Compartment 
Damage Length 30m < LWL < 92m 2 Comp or at least 6m 100ft < LWL < 300ft 2 Comp or at least 6m 
 LWL > 92m Max{15%LWL or 21m} 300ft < LWL 15% LWL 
Permeability Watertight void 97% Watertight void 95% 
 Accommodation 95% Accommodation 95% 
 Machinery 85% Machinery 85-95% 
 Stores etc. 80-95% Stores etc. 60-95% 
Angle of list or loll < 20°   List < 15°   
GZ at C 60% of GZmax  -  
Area A1 > 1.4 A2  > 1.4 A2  
Longitudinal GM > 0  -  
Buoyancy Longitudinal trim less than required to cause down-flooding 3in margin line  
 
4. PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT 
Boulougouris and Papanikolaou (2013, 2004) previously presented a methodology for the 
probabilistic damaged stability assessment and its application to design optimisation. It is 
based on the fundamentals of the probabilistic damage stability concept for passenger vessels 
introduced by Wendel (1960) and its derivatives (IMO Resolution A.265; IMO MSC.19 (58); 
IMO MSC.216 (82)) which are used to assess the ships level of safety after damage. The 
probabilistic approach uses the probability of survival after damage as a measure of the ships 
safety when damaged.  The approach considers the following probabilities of events as being 
relevant to the ships damage stability;   
x The probability that a compartment or group of compartments i may be flooded 
(damaged), pi. 
x The probability that the ship will survive after flooding of the compartment or group 
of compartments i under consideration, si. 
 
The total probability of survival is expressed by the attained subdivision index, A, and is the 
given by the sum of the product of pi and si for each compartment and compartment group, i 
along the ships length.  
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In order for a vessel to comply with the IMO probabilistic method for passenger and dry 
cargo ships (IMO MSC.216 (82)) the attained subdivision index must be greater than or equal 
to the required index. This ensures that the vessel is designed with an acceptable level of risk. 
The effect of sea state on survivability is implicitly accounted for in the IMO probabilistic 
damage stability method, namely the formulation of the si factor is derived from an empirical 
relationship between GZmax, range and critical sea state (HScrit) for a sample of ships. In this 
method the critical sea state is defined as the limiting sea state at which the ship will have a 
50% chance of survival (or not), if exposed to the action of waves for 30 minutes 
(Jasionowski and Vassalos, 2011).  
The required subdivision index 5IRUGU\FDUJRDQGSDVVHQJHUVKLSV LV D IXQFWLRQRI VKLS¶V
size (in terms of subdivision length), the number of people onboard and life boat capacity in 
case of passenger ships.  This required index (R) is consistent with the mean value of the 
attained index (A) from a sample of ships of relevant type, size and passenger capacity (as 
applicable), which dispose in principle a similar level of damage stability risk and acceptable 
survival characteristics. Likewise, for warships, an acceptable level of risk could be specified 
by either the owner (navy) or approval authority (NATO/ classification society) considering 
the desired survival properties of a surface combatant as expressed by the average value of 
calculated attained indices of a satisfactory sample of relevant ships.  
For naval vessels in general there is a probability that the ship will be targeted and engaged 
which may be leading to the flooding of one or more compartments. The damage can occur at 
DQ\SRLQWDORQJWKHVKLS¶Vhull and can vary extensively in magnitude. The extent of damage 
is dependent on both the characteristics of the target (ship) and the threat (weapon). As the 
survivability of the vessel is determined by the vulnerability and susceptibility, the 
probability distribution for damage of a naval ship relates both characteristics.  
The probability of survival of a particular function of the ship can be extracted from the total 
attained index, which represent the ships floatability and stability after damage. If j*={j1, j2, 
j3,.., jn} is the set of compartments that host all systems of the particular function F, then the 
damage of any set j that includes j* will impair the ship from function F. Therefore, the 
probability of survival of the particular function is calculated using the following formula:  
 
. .f i i j j
i j
S p s p s ¦ ¦  (3) 
where j are all damage cases, which include the compartment set j*. 
 
4.1 Determining pi 
'XULQJWKHLQLWLDOVWDJHVRIDQDYDOVKLS¶VGHVLJQZKHQWKHUHLVDODFNRIUHILQHGLQIRUPDWLRQ
IRUWKHWKUHDW¶VVLJQDWXUHGLVWULEXWLRQDORQJWKHVKLSLWFDQEHDVVXPHG that the probability of 
weapon impact along the hull follows a basic mathematical distribution, such as the 
piecewise linear distribution. Boulougouris and Papanikolaou (2004) propose that for air-to-
surface missile (ASM) threats, a piecewise linear distribution with maximum probability 
amidships can be used. As both the ships radar profile and heat emissions due to machinery 
and exhaust are highest at amidships this is the most likely aim point of the weapon.  For 
contact mines a linear distribution can be assumed (Harmsen and Krikke, 2000). Thus the 
LPSDFW SRLQW SUREDELOLW\ GHQVLW\ IXQFWLRQ LQ WKH PLVVLOH¶V FDVH ZLWK D SLHFHZLVH linear 
distribution is;  
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The damage length probability density distribution is based on the concept of the Damage 
Function used in the theory of Defence Analysis (Przemieniecki, 1994). The well-known log-
normal distribution considered the most appropriate for this case. Thus, the damage length 
probability density distribution is given by the following formula;  
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Where LSK is the sure kill length which means that d (LSK) =0.98, LSS is the sure save length 
which means d (LSS) =0.02 and zSS is a constant equal to 1.45222.  
For defining the damage extent range, it is a common approach in naval ship design to 
consider 2 or 3 damaged compartments around the detonation compartment especially in case 
of absence of blast resistant bulkheads (Erkel and Galle, 2003). More detailed estimates may 
result from a careful risk assessment based on live firing tests analysis, the analysis of data 
from actual engagements, empirical formulas linking the damage range with the type and 
weight of the warhead or from the use of damage lengths/extents defined in current 
deterministic damage stability regulations for naval ships. In the latter case, which is the one 
proposed by Boulougouris and Papanikolaou (2004), a first approximation of the LSS can be 
taken according to naval codes DefStan 02-900 and DDS-079 and it would be 0.15L (see 
Table 17KHDXWKRU¶VVWDWHWKDWWKH/SK has can be assumed equal to 0.02L.  
By combining the impact point and damage length density functions the probability of 
damage lying between the boundaries x1 and x2 or a naval ships compartments is;  
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The equations resulting from substituting Dam(y) and Imp(x) into equation (6) were 
presented in Boulougouris and Papanikolaou (2004).  
As with a collision the extent of damage from a threat weapon will vary in magnitude 
transversely and vertically. The transverse damage penetration especially from ASM threats 
can vary extensively and in cases can extend across the full hull. Weapons fitted with time-
delay fuses will penetrate the hull to an optimum position before detonating. However, the 
damage penetration GLVWULEXWLRQ LV QRW DQ µLVVXH¶ IRU VXUIDFH FRPEDWDQWV DV ORQJLWXGLQDO
subdivision which would lead to asymmetrical flooding is avoided by design.  
For the assessment carried out a log-normal distribution with maximum probability at the 
centreline was utilised for the damage penetration distribution in order to calculate reduction 
factors for various damage cases. The vertical extent of damage may also vary depending on 
WKHZHDSRQ¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFV,QDVXUIDFHFRPEDWDQWVXFKDVDIULJDWHRUDGHVWUR\HUWKere are 
3 vertical watertight boundaries, namely the tanktop, the damage control deck and the main 
deck. Excessive vertical watertight boundaries are avoided by design as high flooding can 
lead to poor stability thus it can be favourable to allow lower decks to flood.  In the case of an 
air delivered weapon (e.g. Anti-Ship Cruise Missile) it will generally detonate close to the 
waterline causing greater damage above the waterline and the tank top will most likely 
remain intact. Still, in the case of an underwater weapon (e.g. contact mine or torpedo) which 
detonates close to the keel, the damage control deck will likely remain intact. The problem 
with an underwater explosion is that modern under-keel torpedoes are capable of causing 
extensive damage to the keel girder of even a cruiser sized ship, often this is sufficient to 
cause breaking and sinking of the ship. Such cases are not covered in the proposed 
methodology as the maintenance of structural integrity is a perquisite for the assessment of 
the ships damage stability.  
For a hit by an air-delivered weapon, a linear distribution for the probability density function 
of the vertical extent of damage can be used. Its maximum is at the main deck and the 
minimum at the keel, the opposite is valid for an underwater weapon (see figure 1) 
(Boulougouris and Papanikolaou, 2013). By considering the vertical extent of damage the 
effect of the position of vertical watertight boundaries on the overall survivability of the 
vessel can be observed. In order to take into account both threats, a weighting factor can be 
applied according to an operational analysis of potential threats.  
 
Figure 1 Naval Ship Vertical Watertight Boundaries 
 
4.2 Survival Index Si 
The probability of survival of an intact frigate in waves is related by Mc Taggart and de Kat 
to the probability of capsize, which in turn is related to the probability of exceeding a critical 
roll angle P(ĳ>ĳcritical) (Mc Taggart, 2000). In the case of a damaged ship the probability of 
survival has to take into consideration the probability of sinking without a capsize. For the 
determination of these probabilities, the Naval Stability Standards Working Group (NSSWG) 
is using FREDYN (De Kat, 1994), a time domain simulation tool (Perrault, 2010). 
Another approach to assess the probability of survival after damage is a probabilistic quasi-
static approach adjusted for the currently valid, semi-empirical deterministic criteria for naval 
ships (Boulougouris and Papanikolaou, 2013). The approach considers the probability of 
survival after damage and is based on quasi-static survival criteria such as those used by the 
Royal Navy and US Navy. The criteria were developed from real life damage incidences of 
WWII and although the current criteria have been under criticism as being outdated they have 
proved reliable over the years and thus there have been no significant changes. One of the 
main criticisms of the current criteria is the fundamental assumption that the sea conditions at 
WKHWLPHRIGDPDJHDUH³PRGHUDWH´. This constraint was lifted in the proposed methodology 
with the requirement for a specific survival sea state in case of damage.   
This allows the correction of these requirements by consideration of the probability of 
exceedance of the wave height considered as basis for the current deterministic RN and USN 
criteria, namely a significant wave height HS of merely 8 ft. The wave height is used in the 
FULWHULD LQ RUGHU WR GHILQH ĳroll, the roll amplitude due to wave action. It was also the 
underlying assumption behind the guidelines for establishing the watertight features/closures 
to prevent progressive flooding. Thus, any attempt to change the wave amplitude must take 
LQWRDFFRXQWFKDQJHVLQERWKĳroll as well as the margin line or equivalent.  
As can be seen from Table. 2, the criteria allow the sea state at the time of damage to be 
explicitly accounted for in the probabilistic assessment. The sea state is herein accounted for 
by Hs(0.99), which represents the wave height with a 99% probability of non-exceedance for 
the chosen operational area. This wave height is used for the definition of minimum 
freeboard and represents the most extreme conditions, which the damage ship could be 
exposed to in that operational area. In addition to the 99th percentile Hs. the probability that 
the classical navy criterion of 8ft wave height will not be exceeded, P (HS  8 ft), in the 
operational area is also specified in the criteria. This parameter defines the probability of 
survival when the ship meets the current U.S.N or RN criteria. 
The wind speed is another important parameter which needs to be considered, however given 
the small probability of exceeding the values given by RN and U.S Navy standards, the 
values were left unchanged (approximately 33 knots for a 3500t frigate). Table 2 shows the 
criteria which were applied in the frame of a probabilistic approach to assess the survivability 
of a generic frigate.  
For intermediate stages, interpolant values can be used. Figure 2 shows the meaning of 
various notions of the righting arm curve. 
 
 
Figure 2 Damaged ship GZ criteria 
 
Table 2 Probabilistic damage stability criteria for naval combatants 
si  = 1 
Qroll = 25 deg Wind Speed = According to Defstan 02-900 
A1 $2 0LQ)UHHERDUGLQ+s(0.99) - 8ft) 
si = P(HsIW Ship meets Defstan 02-900 damage Stability Criteria 
si = 0 
Qroll = 15 deg Wind Speed = According to Defstan 02-900 
A1 $2 Longitudinal trim < required to cause downflooding 
 
Implementing the above criteria for ships operating in North Atlantic P(HS  8 ft) would be 
0.56 and for East Mediterranean Sea 0.90  (Athanassoulis and Skarsoulis, 1992). For the 
North Pacific P (HS  8 ft) would be 0.42 (Lee, 1995) and for the South China Sea 0.71 
(Haveman et al., 2006).  
Therefore, a combatant, meeting the U.S. Navy or RN criteria for warships, should have 
according to the proposed criteria a 56% probability of survival in the North Atlantic for a 
damage length not exceeding the current regulations (Ochi, 1978). This probability will 
increase to 90% probability of survival in the Mediterranean Sea and to 71% in the South 
China Sea. On the other hand, in the case of the North Pacific the probability of survival will 
decrease to 42%. Obviously a similar methodology can be introduced for auxiliary naval 
vessels. The minimum required values for compliance could be estimated after application of 
the above procedure to sample/existing ships. 
5. CASE STUDY 
Both the current deterministic approach and newly presented probabilistic approach were 
applied to a generic frigate model which was defined in the Maxsurf package (Bentley 
Systems, 2013). The stability of the vessel was assessed using Maxsurf stability advanced. 
The ships main particulars are given in Table 3 and the 3D hull model is shown in Figure 3.  
Table 3 Main Particulars 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Frigate 3D hull model 
The arrangement is typical for a frigate of this size with a centreline passageway providing an 
un-flooded route across the full length of the damage control deck. The ship has two main 
engine rooms, one for two cruise gas turbines and the other for two boost gas turbines. 
Furthermore, there are two auxiliary machinery rooms forward and aft of the GT rooms. The 
internal layout of the frigate consisted of 13 watertight transverse bulkheads which subdivide 
the hull into 14 main compartments. Three decks form the horizontal watertight boundaries, 
namely the main deck (1st deck), damage control deck (2nd deck) and the tank top (4th deck). 
Main Particulars 
Loa (m) 148.1 
Lwl (m) 137 
Twl (m) 4.31 
Depth (m) 9.3 
Displacement (tons) 4528 
The ship has a 4528t displacement at full load condition without a growth margin and has a 
VCG of 5.53m resulting in a GMcorr of 1.097m. At this condition the ship fulfils the intact 
stability criteria outlined in DefStan 02-900.  
Initially the deterministic assessment was carried out in which all damage cases had to meet 
the criteria outlined in DefStan 02-900.  The specified survivable damage length specified 
(15%Lwl) resulted in a damaged length of 20.55m, thus the minimum length of 21m was 
used to define the damage cases. This resulted in mainly 3 compartment damage cases. 
Several different transverse extents were taken for each damage case including B/5, B/2 and 
penetration across the full beam to ensure to worst possible cases were considered. As the 
frigate model was designed to this standard all damage cases fulfilled the criteria. 
For the quasi-static probabilistic approach damage cases up to 6 adjacent zones were initially 
considered, however the probability of occurrence of both 5 and 6 compartment damage 
extents was found to be insignificant. A total of 226 damage cases extending up to 4 adjacent 
damage zone were defined in Maxsurf stability. The formulas for the calculation of the 
probability of damage occurring, pi, from equation (6), were applied to the basis ship and 
results for single compartment damage zones are given in Table 4. 
Table 4 pi for frigate 1 compartment damage cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the given subdivision arrangement, damage length and longitudinal distribution, 1 
compartment damage cases contribute approximately 0.27 whereas 2, 3 and 4 compartment 
cases contribute 0.6, 0.11 and 0.01 respectively. 
 
Room NZ x1 x2 x1u x2u y Pi 
1 1 0 13 0.000 0.095 0.095 0.007 
2 1 13.0 23.5 0.095 0.172 0.076 0.011 
3 1 23.5 29.3 0.172 0.214 0.042 0.002 
4 1 29.3 41.1 0.214 0.301 0.087 0.030 
5 1 41.1 51.6 0.301 0.377 0.076 0.029 
6 1 51.6 62.0 0.377 0.453 0.076 0.036 
7 1 62.0 72.5 0.453 0.529 0.076 0.042 
8 1 72.5 79.5 0.529 0.581 0.052 0.011 
9 1 79.5 89.1 0.581 0.650 0.070 0.026 
10 1 89.1 102.3 0.650 0.747 0.097 0.046 
11 1 102.3 109 0.747 0.796 0.048 0.004 
12 1 109.0 117.6 0.796 0.859 0.063 0.008 
13 1 117.6 128 0.859 0.935 0.076 0.008 
14 1 128 137 0.935 1.000 0.065 0.001 
 Figure 4 Contribution of various damage cases to attained index 
Two different operational areas were considered in order to determine the influence of sea 
state on survivability, considering the criteria given in Table 2. For the North Atlantic 
6FHQDULRZHDVVXPH3+VIW DQG+V PIRUWKH1RUWK3DFLILF3+VIW
= 0.42 and Hs (0.99) =11.2m. 
For the frigate under consideration at full load condition the attained index was found to be 
A=0.98 for the North Atlantic and A=0.95 for the North Pacific Scenario.  The survivability 
of the mobility function was calculated using equation (3) where j are all the main engine 
room compartments; in this case 5, 6 and 7. This resulted in a mobility survivability index of 
0.87. 
 
Figure 5 North Pacific pi against si 
Figure 5 shows the damage cases which are most likely to occur and their corresponding 
probability of survival for the specified location conditions. The results illustrate that the 
vessel has a low risk of being lost due to damage up to two compartments. Due to the length 
of damage utilised, up to two adjacent compartments contributes approximately 0.87 to the 
attained index. The risk increases significantly for four or more adjacent compartments; 
however, the probability of occurrence of this extent of damage is too low to affect the 
overall attained index.  
The conducted study suggests that the probabilistic approach can be readily used minimising 
the vulnerability of the vessel in the early stages of the design. The results from this approach 
can be easily visualised making the comparison of many different designs more concise for 
the designer. As the resXOWRIDGHWHUPLQLVWLFDVVHVVPHQWLVVLPSO\DµSDVVRUIDLO¶IRUHDFKRI
the damage cases, it is actually difficult to quantify the effect of any major design change on 
the overall survivability of the vessel.  Furthermore, the use of the attained survivability index 
in the probabilistic approach enables the designer to adopt a holistic approach to naval ship 
survivability and allows him to easily monitor the influence of his decisions on the 
survivability.  
Whatever deterministic damage length is defined, it directly influences the position of 
transverse watertight bulkheads; namely, the specified deterministic length of damage implies 
that the length of either two or three compartments should be kept slightly larger than the 
damage length. This results in larger ships being designed with longer compartments to limit 
the extent of flooding in fewer compartment cases. Therefore, the deterministic subdivision 
methodology simply follows the concept of compliance with a set of deterministic criteria, as 
opposed to an optimisation for maximum survivability for a range of damage lengths of 
varying probability of occurrence. The use of the probabilistic approach in a formal, multi-
objective  optimisation procedure allows the designer to rationally achieve the optimum level 
of survivability, while keeping ship's weight and shaft length to a minimum (Boulougouris 
and Papanikolaou, 2013). 
By relaxing the assumption for a moderate sea state (Hs=2.4m or 8ft) at the time of damage, 
it gives a more demanding and realistic set of criteria, which can ultimately result in a higher 
level of survivability. The currently used significant wave height in the deterministic 
approach has a 58% chance of exceedance in the North Pacific and a 44% chance of 
exceedance in the North Atlantic. Thus, it does not properly reflect the harsh environments, 
which modern surface combatants are expected to operate in. Through the application of the 
probabilistic approach, the survival sea state can be explicitly defined in the criteria (Table. 
2). This allows the ship¶s survivability to be assessed on the basis of mission area 
performance requirements.  The results illustrate the influence of the operational area on 
survivability, with the probability of survival decreasing by 3% when changing from the 
North Atlantic to the North Pacific.  
 
5.1 Damage Length 
The current IMO regulations for dry cargo and passenger ships (IMO MSC.216 (82)) 
consider collision damage lengths of up to 24% Lbp, thus any length of damage over 24% Lbp 
is considered as statistically insignificant. This means that collision damage extents of less 
than 24% Lbp (but still greater than 15% weapon damage length) are statistically significant.  
In order to develop a refined set of probabilistic criteria for naval ships extensive calculations 
must be carried out on a sample of ships, which comply with the current damage stability 
regulations. A study was carried out in order to explore the effects of the damage length in 
which the ship is expected to survive on the overall survivability. The aim was to provide 
insight regarding the extent of damage modern naval ships are capable of surviving. This can 
therefore lead to a more rational approach of basing the damage extent on an assessment of 
threat while still having a set of criteria which can be reasonably met resulting in a higher 
level of survivability.  
Initially the maximum length of damage was increased from 15% Lwl (or 21m) to 20% Lbp for 
the deterministic assessment. This led to a damage length of 27m resulting in a majority of 
four compartment damage cases. The new length of damage fulfilled the deterministic criteria 
for all cases; however, the criteria were met with a much lower margin for the 4 compartment 
cases. A single 5 compartment case at the bow of the vessel was also assessed in which it 
passed the reserve buoyancy criteria by 0.17m.  
Similarly, for the quasi-static probabilistic assessment the maximum length of damage in the 
distribution was increased from 15% to 24% Lwl.  The value of Lss (equation 5) was set to 
20% Lbp which altered the damage length distribution. For the new damage length, 1 
compartment cases now contribute 0.22 and 2, 3 and 4 compartment damage cases contribute 
0.57, 0.17 and 0.03 respectively. For a 15% damage length, 1 and 2 compartment cases 
contributed 0.87 to the attained index; however, that decreased to 0.79 for a 0.2L damage. An 
attained index of A=0.96 was obtained for the North Atlantic scenario and A=0.93 for the 
North Pacific scenario. Finally, the damage length was increased to 0.24L. As collision 
damage extents over 0.24L are considered to be statistically insignificant this was taken as 
the maximum value for the study. At approximately ¼ of the ships lengths this resulted in a 
large number of 5 compartment damage scenarios for the deterministic assessment. At this 
point the basis frigate failed the assessment in several cases due to both insufficient 
transverse stability and reserve buoyancy.  
 
Figure 6 Contributions to attained index 
For the probabilistic assessment the 0.24L damage length led to an attained index of A=0.94 
for the North Atlantic and A=0.90 for the North Pacific Scenario. The 4 and 5 compartment 
cases now contribute a maximum of 0.05 to the attained index as opposed to approximately 
0.01 for the 0.15L case. Figure 6 and 7 show the difference in contribution to the attained 
index for various damage cases and the effect on the attained index for each of the maximum 
damage lengths investigated. 
 Figure 7 Survivability against max damage length 
Figure 8 illustrates the different contributions to the attained index for the frigate under 
consideration in the outlined probabilistic approach and also when considering IMO 
MSC.216 (82); both assessments are for a damage length of 0.24L. As a damage from a 
threat weapon will result in greater damage extent than from collision, there is a peak at two 
compartment damage as opposed to one compartment damage in the case of the linear 
distribution of SOLAS. 
 
Figure 8 Comparison of damage length distributions 
Although SOLAS considers damage lengths up to 0.24Lbp, the use of the linear damage 
length distribution results in a more conservative estimate of the level of survivability. The 
linear distribution from SOLAS 2009 was applied and an attained index of A=0.97 was 
obtained for the North Atlantic and A=0.94 for the North Pacific. Using the log-normal 
distribution with the same maximum length of damage (0.24L) the values obtained where 
A=0.94 for the North Atlantic and A=0.90 for the North Pacific. 
It is observed that the log-normal distribution is more practical for naval ships as it can 
accurately represent the extent of damage associated with weapon effects. The use of the log-
normal distribution will increase the likelihood of occurrence of damage cases involving 
multiple adjacent zones, therefore resulting in a more accurate estimate of survivability.  
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The use of a probabilistic approach to assess the damage stability of a naval combatant can 
lead to a higher level of survivability. The use of the probabilistic assessment through the 
attained subdivision index allows a holistic approach to be taken to surface ship survivability. 
This allows ship's subdivision to be optimised for minimum risk (or maximum Attained Index) 
making survivability a distinct feature of the naval ship design and no longer a requirement. 
In addition, the use of more realistic operating conditions such as sea state at the time of 
damage will give the designer a better understanding of the damaged ship's performance and 
limitations.  
The conducted study on the damage length margin for a naval ship shows that the length can 
be readily increased to more accurately represent damages reflecting possible weapon threats 
and without compromising the position of bulkheads.  It illustrates that current naval vessels 
are capable of surviving greater damage lengths than previously specified. Thus, altering the 
damage length distribution for naval ships appears to be fully justified, whereas the impact on 
design is not anticipated to be drastic. In any case, the length of damage can be more 
rationally refined, namely based on current weapon threats which a combatant may face in its 
life cycle, resulting in a more realistic representation of the ship's survivability.  
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